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Jurists, like other men, are in their attitude to the employment of logic either 
intellectualists or mystics. The intellectualist not only trusts implicitly all the results of 
reasoning but believes that no safe result can be obtained in any other way. Hence in law 
he emphasizes the rule rather than the decision. This, however, leads to an ignoring of the 
absurd consequences to which the logical application of the rules frequently leads. 
Summa jus summa iniuria. The mystics distrust reasoning. They have faith in intuition, 
sense, or feeling. “Men are wiser than they know,” says Emerson, and the Autocrat of the 
Breakfast Table, who was not a stranger to the study of the law, adds, “You can hire 
logic, in the shape of a lawyer, to prove anything you want to prove.” Morris Cohen, 
“The Place of Logic in the Law” (Harv. L. Rev. 1916, 29, 622.). 
The criticism of formal logic is an attack upon a dummy overstuffed for the 
occasion. Mortimer Adler, “Law and the Modern Mind.” (Columbia L. Rev. 1931, 31, 
91.) 
 
Professor Plug’s paper is a very interesting one, the conclusions of which I find myself in 
substantial agreement. The relationship between legislative argument and judicial interpretation 
of statutes is greatly vexed and argument theorists should be well situated to clarify a matter 
fundamental to democratic practice. Professor Plug raises two large questions: put broadly, how 
do the separate argument fields of legislative politics and legal interpretation interact? and, what 
are the argumentative methods and schemata used by jurists when they interpret legislative 
documents? Professor Plug categorizes these argument schemes within the systems of 
symptomatic and pragmatic argument adumbrated by van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and 
Henkemans (2002). Once legal arguments are categorized in this fashion we can more easily see 
the critical questions pertinent to each sort of argument. As Plug states in concluding her 
remarks, “...insight into the argument scheme is particularly important in view of the evaluation 
of the argument, since for each type of argumentation different criteria of soundness are 
applicable.”  According to van Eemeren (2000, 97), for instance, arguments based on 
symptomatic relationships are best examined by the asking of several questions about them; are 
the factual claims embedded within the schema accurate?, are the posited symptomatic 
relationship as strong as the arguer would have us infer?, aren’t there also other non-Ys that have 
characteristic Z?, and aren’t there also other Ys that do not have characteristic Z? Similarly, Plug 
points out that pragmatic arguments can be tested not only by means of standard critical 
questions (“does Z always lead to Y?”) but by more value oriented inquiries (“is Y a 
consequence worth arguing for?”). Plug also suggests that a number of strategic maneuvers are 
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available to an arguer, the choice of which is bound by essentially rhetorical considerations. 
Using the taxonomy supplied by van Eemeren she suggests three steps in the selection of these 
strategic maneuvers: 1) making an expedient choice from the options constituting the topical 
potential associated with the particular discussion stage, 2) selecting a response adapted to 
audience expectations, and 3) exploiting the appropriate ‘presentational devices.’ 
Here Plug leaves the issue. What I will pursue here is more of an extension of Professor 
Plug’s thesis than a criticism. The focus of my response will be to describe how contemporary 
jurists have considered the “topical potential” of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, the second 
section of this essay will discuss briefly four matters, the canons of argument judges use to 
interpret statutes, some of the current controversies in the United States over principles of 
statutory interpretation, recent legal scholarship prescribing topical modes of argument about 
statutory interpretation, and, finally, the relationship of this professional literature with the 
topical schemes of rhetorical invention known as the stasis system. In conclusion I will make 
some general theoretical remarks about the forms of argument used by judicial interpreters. 
These remarks will demonstrate the difficulty of the interface between informal logic and 
jurisprudence and may be profoundly discomforting to both pragma-dialectitians and informal 
logicians. Though I will rely on the tradition of legal argumentation with which I am most 
familiar, that of the United States, I believe that the underlying principals can be easily 
generalized.  
 
II. 
 The problem that Professor Plug raises is, quite simply, the single most contentious issue 
in United States jurisprudence. The current controversy over the rules of argument pertinent to 
statutory interpretation is deeply divisive and reflective of profound disagreements over the role 
of a judiciary in a democracy.  
 Anglo-American jurisprudence has been bound, throughout the modern era, by what is 
called the plain language rule of interpretation. Under this rule, in effect since at least the 18th 
century, a judge’s responsibility is to apply the law ‘as it is written’ (Thorne 2001). Exception 
can only be made for laws that are deemed to be ambiguous. The rule in the United States is 
supplied by Overseas Education Association v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (876 F.2d 960 
[D.C. Circuit 1989]) which holds that a statute must be shown to be ambiguous before any other 
canon of construction can be invoked. Ambiguity is defined for jurists in State ex. rel. Neelsen v. 
Lucas (24 Wisc. 2nd 262, 128 N.W. 2nd 425 [1964]) by means of a “reasonable person” rule, “a 
statute is ambiguous when two reasonably well informed persons could understand the language 
in two or more senses.” The plain language rule is also required to be employed by jurists in 
most Uniform Code statutory systems, such as New York Consolidated Laws (sec. 71-92). 
 When statutes are found to be ambiguous -- and this happens quite often, after all courts 
rarely consider easy cases -- jurists have available to them a number of topical guides, called 
canons of construction, by which they can attempt to reduce the ambiguity of the text. A recent 
book by William Eskridge (2000) identifies more than twenty of these canons, most inherited 
from English common law. By way of illustration, two well-known canons focus on the 
reduction of ambiguity caused by lists within statutes, a very common problem of statutory 
interpretation. Ejusdem generis (‘of the same class’) holds that when general terms follow 
specific terms in a list, the general terms are to construed to embrace only things similar to those 
enumerated. So, if we have a law that gives an agency the right to sell off certain assets in its 
possession, say, “gravel, sand, and earth or other material.” They may not construe the rule to 
 2 
R.G. Sullivan’s commentary on J. Plug’s  
“Where Political and Legal Arguments Meet: Reconstructing the Intention of the Legislator” 
 
include such things as timber, oil rights, or computers, but may use it justify the sale of clean fill 
or field stones. A second, widely used canon that also governs enumerations in statutes is 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This holds, roughly, that ‘whatever is omitted is understood 
to be excluded.’ United States copyright law is almost supernaturally complex and the materials 
brought under its protection are enumerated in excruciating detail. That enumeration, however, 
does not end in a generally term such as ‘and other similar material.’ Because architectural 
blueprints are not enumerated in the statute expressio unius suggests that architectural blueprints 
are not protected by U.S. copyright law. 
 Canons of construction, then, are topical tools used by jurists to interpret statutes in 
relatively stable ways. Intrinsic canons, such as those described above, are considered superior to 
extrinsic canons that direct the jurist to examine legislative history as a means of arriving at a 
legislature’s intent. And, it should be remembered that extrinsic canons can only be used after it 
has been determined that a statute is ambiguous. 
 These canons were the traditional backbone of judicial interpretation and stood without 
serious challenge until the middle of the 20th century, when they came under vigorous scholarly 
attack. The key blow against them was an article by Karl Llewellyn (1950) that demonstrated 
that for every canon, there was an equally compelling counter-canon. The law reviews were soon 
full of articles calling for judges to pay greater attention to legislative intent (Hart & Sacks 1958, 
Jones 1952, Hurst 1982). American courts leapt on board and the following period became 
known as the era of ‘legal realism,’ in which a judge’s central task seemed to be the 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes in light of a legislature’s intentions. Under this regime it was 
not at all unusual for judges to base interpretations on such things as statutory preambles, reports 
of legislative debates, and compendia of legislative histories. 
 Legal realism was a modern articulation of an old idea, that once the intrinsic canons of 
construction had been exhausted jurists could turn to legislative intent in order to clarify an 
ambiguous statute. In the past, jurists often attempted to define a statute’s general legislative 
purpose, often by reference to their assumptions about the aim of legislation, or even social 
mores. The locus classicus of ‘purposeivism’ is the majority ruling in Church of the Holy Trinity 
v. The United States [143 U.S. 457,1892)] where it was held that a Federal immigration law that 
prohibited the importation of contracted workers into the United States could not possibly be 
applied to the hire of a British minister, because -- against all textual evidence -- it seemed 
inconceivable to the Court that the Congress of a “Christian nation” would intend such a thing. 
This sort of purposeivism seems to me what Plug refers to the “second form of the genetic 
argument” and which she places in a pragmatic argumentative scheme. Purposeivism is only 
very rarely invoked in the modern era, at least in the United States. 
 The legislative intent sought after by legal realists is more akin to what Plug call the “first 
form of the genetic arguments,” or “what the legislator directly intended.” This sort of legislative 
intentionalism aims at the clarification of the statutory text. That is, it investigates extrinsic 
canons of construction as a means of gathering evidence as to why the legislature phrased a law 
in the manner that they did, and of better discerning meanings of the words of the statute. 
The conceptual and theoretical problems of establishing legislative intent by means of 
extrinsic canons of construction are manifest and profound. The fundamental critique of 
intentionalism is that it relies on a radically idealized notion of legislative action. Intentionalists 
seem to believe that legislatures have a single, articulable, purpose for passing any given statute; 
that, in essence, all who voted for it did so for the same reason. This, of course, is nonsense as 
statutes are the results of compromises that are made at every level of the legislative process. 
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Accordingly, when jurists isolate some statement in a legislative history they cannot know if that 
statement says anything about the purposes of anyone else, or the legislature as a whole, or 
whether the purpose (if such a thing could be isolated) of the bill at any particular stage in the 
legislative process is the same as the purpose of the bill which was finally passed. Quite simply, 
many would argue that it is impossible to isolate the unitary intention of a collective body 
(Shepsle 1992), requiring jurists to, as has been famously suggested, “scan the crowd in front of 
them and wave to their friends.” This problem is only multiplied in complexity when we discuss 
the purposes of bi-cameral legislatures. When intentionalists turn to legislative history other 
problems of method arise. There is, for instance no common law hierarchy of sources of 
legislative history, though legal scholars have suggested some (Erskine 2000, 307). On account 
of this structural tendency to arbitrary judgments intentionalist jurists are accused of 
undermining both the authority of law and the confidence of laypeople in the law, and more 
fundamentally, of being, in essence, anti-democratic.  
 In recent years there has been a virtual revolution against ‘legal realism,’ led by some of 
America’s most prominent jurists and legal scholars. “New Textualists” have forcefully called 
for the return of the plain language rule to the heart of jurisprudence (Vermule 1999 2000, 
Sunstein 1999, Wald 1990, Bell 2000, Eskridge 1991 1994 1998, Marshall 1989, Posner 1986, 
Scalia 1997). New Textualists anchor their theory of interpretation in a series of assumptions: 
that the task of a jurist is to apply laws passed by a democratically elected legislature, that 
legislative intention is communicated directly through the text of a statute, that interpretation of 
statutes is a relatively simple matter of common sense reading, and that the tiny number of truly 
ambiguous statutes that do exist can be clarified by the application of the intrinsic canons of 
construction. The net effect is a radical reduction of a judge’s ability to construe a statute beyond 
its linguistic surface. 
 New Textualist practice has been described as implying nothing less than a ‘linguistic 
turn’ in jurisprudence. Indeed, some have called for linguists to be qualified as experts so that 
they might assist in the proper interpretation of statutes (Cunningham 1994). New Textualism’s 
rigorous parsimony has had such an effect on jurisprudence that legal scholarship has taken note 
of the frequency with which judges, especially those on the U.S. Supreme Court, use dictionaries 
as tools for the interpretation of statutes (Randolph 1994, Harvard Law Review 1994). Justice 
Antonin Scalia, in a recent speech, reported by the Washington Post, (4/12/03 p.5), discussed his 
use of an 18th century dictionary to “make sure he understands what the Constitution’s words 
meant to the men who wrote them.” Scalia’s preferences in contemporary dictionaries are 
legendary. He disdains Webster’s 3rd, for instance, as being merely descriptive, and will only 
accept definitions taken from the prescriptive 1st or 2nd editions. 
 The extremity of some of these New Textualist positions (and perhaps the political 
conservatism of many of its adherents, as well) has drawn a vigorous counter-offensive. 
Increasingly, legal scholars see New Textualism as wooden, reductionist, and based on cavalier 
dismissals of recurrent and difficult interpretive problems (Sinclair 1997 1999 2000 2002, 
Alienkoff 1988, Chomsky 2000). Linguists, in particular, have taken strong offense with what 
they see as New Textualism’s primitive conceptions of both the field of linguistics and the 
problems of meaning (Sinclair 1985, Schroth 1998, Miller 1990, Golanski 2002, Brewer 1996). 
In Golanski’s words New Textualism relies less on disciplinary linguistics than a “farrago of folk 
psychological truisms about linguistic meaning.”  Textualist judges also seem to have a radically 
idealized notion of legislative action, in which hyper-rational legislatures fully and consciously 
invest statutes with their intentions, and hyper-literate drafters craft statutes that perfectly 
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articulate those intentions. Critics of textualism point out that if discerning the plain language of 
statutes was as simple a matter as textualists suppose, then we should have many fewer wrangles 
among textualist judges about what statutes mean. Textualists have also come under fire for a 
text-fetishism which can lead to absurd results. 
Critics of New Textualism argue for a “principled eclecticism,” what they call “dynamic” 
theories of statutory interpretation that would supplement the plain language rule with attention 
to the canons of construction and renewed attention to legislative intent, in effect a return to a 
chastened, but flexible, ‘legal realism.’ 
 It should be pointed out that though the battle has been joined anew among scholars rigid 
textualism is the order of the day in United States jurisprudence. So great has been the influence 
of New Textualism – and, on account of political reasons, this influence will continue far into the 
future – that lawyers, pragmatists as they are, have generated a number of ingenious strategies 
for working within the textualist regime. Gregory (2002), for instance, argues that in modern 
legal practice, the invocation of the plain language rule has become a powerful weapon. 
Accordingly, the advocate must arrive in court with arguments constructed to demonstrate how 
the plain meaning of a statute should be interpreted to his client’s advantage. Gregory describes 
three strategies, what he calls “gambits,” for getting around New Textualist judges. In the ‘plain 
meaning gambit’ one seeks to be the first advocate, regardless of whether the statute seems to 
favor one’s client, to argue that the plain meaning of the statute points to the superiority of their 
client’s position. This is intended to trick the opposing advocate into arguing that this 
interpretation would violate the intention of the legislature, a plea that is likely to fail with a 
textualist judge. The second strategy suggested by Gregory is the high-risk ‘textual end-run’ by 
which one argues that the statute is so poorly framed that it would lead to absurd or contrary 
results. Gregory’s third strategy, ‘using text to bypass text,’ is employed to show how the 
language of a specific statutory passage should be interpreted in the context of similar passages 
in the statute as a whole. 
 To get a sense of the concrete (not to say wooden) quality of this sort of topical 
argumentative scheme, see Gregory here on the ‘plain language gambit (2002, 466).’ 
 
An additional reason for invoking the plain language rule, in seemingly inapposite 
circumstances, is organizational. The Supreme Court has stated that the interpretive 
inquiry begins with a statute’s text. Although the Court has indicated that an 
unambiguous text generally ends that interpretive inquiry, a party rarely stops at the text. 
Typically, the party first advances a textual argument. Next the party marshals the 
relevant legislative history. Lastly, the party looks at the broader purpose of the statute. 
This linear form of argument tends to provoke plain language arguments. A party wants 
to construct and argument in which the text, history and purpose combine to create a clear 
picture of congressional intent. To strike the right note, at the textual stage, a party will 
want to argue that the text is plain. The party will construct the argument in this manner: 
the language of the statute is clear; any doubt on the point is put to rest by the legislative 
history; the reading of the statute supported by the text and history furthers the overall 
purpose of the statute. 
 
If the passage above smacks of casuistry it is also consistent with the spirit of much of the legal 
literature on strategies for dealing with the new jurisprudence. It should also ring bells for 
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anyone who has ever read classical rhetorical theory, as it has a close, arguably chromosomal, 
relationship with the topical inventional scheme known as the stasis, or status system.  
Stasis schemes were inventional devices for accomplishing two things in ancient forensic 
rhetoric; determining the crucial issue to be determined in any case, and, once the issue had been 
determined, the suggestion of particular lines of argument (topoi) associated with the issue. All 
of these accounts divide cases into issues of ‘action’ (in most cases including the categories of 
fact, definition, quality, and jurisdiction) and issues of textual interpretation. These issues, the 
controversia in scripto, vary somewhat in the various accounts but more similarities exist than 
dissimilarities. A representative account is to be found in Cicero’s De Inventione where, at I. 17 
he distinguishes between five classes of dispute that can arise from the interpreration of a 
document or law; ambiguity (ex ambiguo), letter vs. intention of the law (ex scripto et sententia), 
contrary laws (ex contrariies legibus), correspondence or analogy (ex ratiocinatione), and 
definition (ex definitione). 
Having identified the issues in Book I, Cicero turns in Book II to the matter of how to 
argue them. By far the longest treatment (in all accounts, by the way) is of how two parties 
should approach questions of spririt vs. intent (DeInv. II 121-143). 
There we are to imagine that two parties have identified the krinomenon for the judge 
through the pragmatics of accusation, denial, containment and rejoinder. 
 
 
 
ACCUSATION -----------------Æ DENIAL 
You have violated    No, I have not… 
my copyright!         | 
       | 
       | 
        
REJOINDER ---------------Æ Å--------- CONTAINMENT 
This was merely an  | …U.S. copyright law 
oversight in the  | does not protect 
drafting of the law.  | architectural blueprints. 
Legislative history  | 
makes it clear they   | 
are covered.   | 
    | 
KRINOMENON 
   Did the legislature intend to protect the 
   copyrights of architectural blueprints? 
 
Having been brought to this ‘matter to be judged,’ Cicero provides both parties with 
concrete and specific lines of argument, commonplaces or loci. So, for instance, if the accuser 
(as in our example) argues that the law has a purpose at odds with the text, Cicero recommends 
that the defendant amplify on two arguments: 1) it is not for the reader to argue the intention of 
the writer, that the legislator who wrote the text expressed his intentions with the text as written 
and following this, 2) that if judges interpret beyond the confines of the text there will be 
confusion in society as to what any legal document might mean (DeInv. II 128). Conversely, the 
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litigant attacking the letter of the law has the more complex, but equally concrete task of offering 
ten arguments in a series: 1) that equity is on the litigant’s side, 2) that the authors of the law 
would have approved of this interpretation, 3) that judges are competent to judge the spirit of the 
law, 4) that if legislators had thought judges to be fools they could have covered every 
contingency in their statutes, 5) that any clerk can read the text of a law, that judges must 
interpret them, 6) after that (postea) the speaker should pose absurd hypotheticals which a strict 
textual reading would produce, 7) that people interpret intentions all of the time in everyday life, 
8) next (deinde), amplify on the churlishness of literal interpretations of the law, 9) then (deinde), 
say that we value laws not on account of their texts but because of their purposes, and 10) after 
that (postea) set forth the true purpose of the law. 
 The most interesting feature of status based argumentation is its determined (perhaps 
over-determined) nature. The system does not merely suggest the topical potential of subject 
matters, it actually supplies what both sides are supposed to say when faced with a given 
situation. We even have many indicators that the treatment of these topics is supposed to be 
conducted in a particular order. What Cicero describes then, is less a general system of general 
argumentation than an efficient response system for advocates within an interpretive regime. 
 
III. 
Significant theoretical problems become apparent if we approach current practices of 
statutory interpretation through the lenses of either informal logic or pragma-dialectics. 
Argument theorists will readily recognize that topical forms of argument, such as those of the 
stasis system or the intrinsic canons of construction, do not rest on creative inventional structures 
or schemata. Neither do they lend themselves easily to critical analysis. Nor do they seek to aid 
critical discussion. 
To begin with, commonplace systems are purely prescriptive. By ‘prescriptive’ I do not 
mean that they recommend sound, or even criteria based argumentative practices, as we often use 
the term. The ‘prescriptiveness’ of commonplace systems refers to the fact that they suggest 
specific and concrete things for advocates to say whenever they encounter particular situations. 
The general formula for topical systems is, “If you find yourself in situation X, say Y. If your 
opponent says Y, say Z..” The commonplaces, in this sense are not creative but reiterative 
systems of argument. Professor Plug notes, for instance, that by assigning methods of statutory 
interpretation to various argumentative schemata we gain insight into how that argument might 
be criticized. Commonplace schemes, however, are neither generated by nor criticized as 
argument types, but are merely off the rack strategies to be employed when prudence indicates 
they might obtain. If we imagine commonplaces being played as a series of predictable gambits 
by three players (opposing counsel and a judge) who are well educated in the rules, much of the 
creative power of critical discussion is drained away.  
In addition, commonplace systems neither theoretically nor logically exhaust the topical 
potential available in any situation, but merely suggest a (relatively short) list of familiar things 
to say when one encounters such situations. Commonplace systems are produced by induction 
and based on the ‘best practices’ of professional advocates. Quite simply, they are gathered or 
collected, rather than theorized. Informal logicians and pragma-dialecticians might both be 
discomforted by such radically over-determined systems. 
Finally, commonplace systems, if the terms amoral or apolitical seem pejorative, are 
surely and entirely pragmatic. They are idealized in neither argumentative nor ethical terms. 
Gregory (and Cicero, for that matter) is not concerned with the question of whether his gambits 
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will create sound arguments, nor is he interested in the abstract quality of the outcome. He is 
concerned with giving good value to his client. He makes no judgment of the validity of the 
textualist regime, he is solely concerned with maneuvering within it. If ‘legal realism’ returned, I 
think it fair to imagine he would be happy to produce strategies for working around that regime. 
The same can, of course be said of the stasis system. Pragma-dialecticians might well quail at the 
thought of a system of argumentation which commits interlocutors to adversarial and 
contradictory lines of argument the point of which is not to produce critical discussion but 
victory (Kagan 2001). 
In sum then, I would suggest that argument theorists should follow up on Plug’s essay in 
three ways. 
First of all, we need a comprehensive and realistic account of the argumentative practices 
of legislatures and jurists. I think that the assumptions and practices of these two groups differ so 
greatly that they can and should be considered different argumentative fields; indeed they seem 
to be paradigms cases of greatly separated argument fields. Plug very correctly identifies the 
essential task of statutory interpretation as being the reconstruction of legislative intent. I hope 
that my response at least suggests that the assumptions of jurists and legal scholars about 
legislative intent are often improperly idealized or based on overly simplistic accounts of the 
problem of textual meaning. Scholars of argumentation should not make the same mistakes. In 
particular, our accounts of statutory interpretation should be informed by a sophisticated account 
of legislative practices (debates, committee work, compromise) and legislative documents 
(drafting conventions, canons of construction). We should also be particularly well placed to 
examine the fundamental problem of identifying unitary intentions in the complex, collective, 
activity of legislation.  
Secondly, I believe we need to examine more carefully the “topical gambiting” that 
marks legal advocacy. In most of the West, legal systems are adversarial. Advocates aim to get 
maximally advantageous results for their clients (corporate, political, or individual) with little 
regard for abstract notions of justice, much less sound argument. Our appraisals of legal 
argumentation should take these values into account. Jurisprudence is more of a decision system 
than a system of critical discussion and our analyses should recognize this. 
Lastly, and most generally, I think we need to re-examine the processes of topical 
argument. Topical systems, such as the status system and the canons of interpretation, are often 
thought to be a lesser, primitive, form of argument. This is most unfortunate. Ignoring them, or 
merely criticizing them for being what they are, simply abandons the field. Argumentation 
scholars might well consider the degree to which topical systems can function as inventional 
devices. 
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